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3.

Darwinism and the Rise of Social Science

The two areas of the social sciences which were most stimu
lated by Darwin's research were anthropology and sociology. The
Frenchman, S^KBale-Conite (1798-1857), generally regarded as the
fattipr nf
+V>rv
O-i nat.nr nf that term. 1 aid the
groundwork for th*:^ immAriiatp annii cation of the law of evoluti.Q
to the study of society^. Comte's conception of sociology is
derived from his philosophy of history. Sharing the Enlighten
ment belief in progr^s, Comte saw history evolving throuaJithiifi£_Ktag.es. The t^irs^ was the theologl^'ai stayp, in which men
piippi
ai:iations for nattiral and social phe
nomena. This was followed.j33L_what Comte called the metaphysical
stage, a p^iod when merTlyere immersed in speculation^ -Tlie.^
"nineteenth century. he contended, was witnessing the jjajm-oJ-Jthe
:^tliird^ or pos,ltIjvi St, stage of hum^_ii.i stnrsTI
Man was searching
fQI^, am^oiifd find, scientific la^ to explain social phenomen'^,
Comte was convinced that'through the discovery of these laws man
would be able to control his destinyo
After the publication of
the Origin of Species^ many thinkers were persuaded that the
^
principal law had been discovered.
'
Among those inspired by Darwin's biological law of evolu
tion was Edward Burnett Tvlor (1832-1917), the father of social
or cultural anthropology. Anthropology is "the science that
•studies man as both a physical and a social being, finding its
materaraTs" and problems primarily in the races, languages, and
cultures to be found in various places and at various times in
man's history. Physical anthropology deals .with thft.. bodily form
oJE-ittan, special attehfTon being given to racial differences.
Social anthropology studies linguistic and cultural differences

o
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between and among groups of hiaman beings,
Tylor was born of Quaker parents in England during a time
when the university regulations of that country denied admis
sion to Quakers, His formal education, consequently, was lim
ited, Poor health during adolescence caused him to abandon
work in his father's brass foundry and to travel abroad. He
made a tour of Mexico and his first book was an account of the
investigations made during this trip, Ty]r>r'''ct ma-jny work was
Primitive Culture; Researches into the Development of Mythol
ogy, PhiTosophy7~Religxon, Language, Art~and Custom 1T871)"
wETch auickly"Tecaiie the standard "treaTis"e~on anthropology,
From 1883 to the closing years oT'hiiTTri, TyTor^as at Oxford.
He served originally as keeper of the museum and later as the
university's first professor of anthropology,
Tylor's importance as an anthropologist is to be found
less in his concTusi^ns than in his general_.japprQach
^'slBjia^T'oT^societies", flppTi
iit i onivrv theories to the
races of mankind, falling into the then-common error which held
that the NegriiijtL-aBd MongolQiji..jaces repxfiaeiate.CIsSra&ea,.iji..^^t^
development of theJh:aMLa>a^JF.ase, Tylor has also been criticized
--•'^oFex^arfiTng tlTat the customs of primitive peoples were the
result of their moral and intellectual inferiority, and for
not understanding them as the product of historical conditions
and environmental forces. But his contribution to the devel
opment of the social sciences cannot be judged from such con
clusions, His true significance lies in the fact that he was
actually open-minded regarding methods for explaining human
life in all its complexity. As the following selection from
Primitive Culture indicates, his ma in mnroT-n was that man
m^.jL,studj^Jiis__culJ|y:.e>,_as,,A,-.&^PLlgS,.^^^^
himself.
"""""
Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide eth
nographic sense, is that complex whole which includes
knowledge„ belief, art, moralss law, custom, and any
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a mem
ber of society. The condition of cralture among the
various societies of mankind, in so far as it is capable
of being investigated on general principles^ is a subje<^
apt for the study of laws of human thought and action.
On the one hand, the uniformity which so largely pervades civilization mav be asf-.ribfid. in great measure,
the uniform action of uniform causes: while on the other
hand its various grades may be regarded as stages of
development_-ax ryftlnn each the outcome of previous
history, and about to do its proper part in shaping the
history of the future. To the investigation of these
two great principles in several departments of ethnog
raphy, with especial consideration of the civilization
of the lower tribes as related to the civilization of
the higher nations the present volumes are devoted.
Our modern investigators in the sciences of inorganic
nature are foremost to recognize, both within and without
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their special fields of work, the unity of oatiirff. the
fixity of _JJ^-laws, the definlJ^e-JSjOimgJlga-jgf ranse .And
ef fect~~through whi-ChL-.-fixexy- fae-t--depends Qa.»iyfea-t,has. gone
be7o?e~3rrr"and"acts upon what is to come MAex-it. They
grasp firmlynthV'Pythagorean doctrine of pervading order
in the universal Kosmos. They affirm, with Aristotle,
that nature is not full of incoherent episodes, like a
bad tragedy. They agree with Leibnitz in what he calls
"my axiom, that nature never acts by leaps (la nature
n'agit jamais par saut)as well as in his "great prin
ciple, commonly little employed, that nothing happens
without its sufficient reason." Nor, again, in studying
the structure and habits of plants and animals, or in
investigating the lower functions even of man, are these
leading ideas unacknowledged. But when we come to talk
of the higher processes of human feeling and action, of
thought and language, knowledge and art, a change appears
in the prevalent tone of opinion. The world at large is
scarcely prepared to accept the general stufly 01 human
life as a branch of natiiral science, and to carry out, in
a large sense, the poet's injunction to "Account for moral
as for natural things." To many educated minds tjere
seems something presumptuoui^.a.nfiCri'gSfri^'ive"^
that
mankind i
historirof nature, that our thoughts,
anf^ actio
laws "as definite as. those which govern the
motion of wavfis. the comb"inati6ft 0_t ar.iris and bases
"
tV^^ |;yrnw±J3---<»#-H9-3rft»4gI a " a j ^
The main reasons of this state of t£e popular judg
ment are not far to seek. There are many who would will
ingly accept a science of history if placed before them
with substantial definiteness of principle and evidence,
but who not unreasonably reject the systems offered to
them, as falling too far short of a scientific standard.
Through resistance such as this, real knowledge always
sooner or later makes its way, while the habit of opposition
to novelty does such excellent service against the invasions
of speculative dogmatism, that we may sometimes even wish
it were stronger than it is. But other obstacles to the
investigation of laws of human nature arise from consid
erations of metaphysics and theology. The popular notion
of free human will involves not only freedom to act in
accordance with motive, but also a power of breaking loose
from continuity and acting without cause, -- a combination
which may be roughly illustrated by the simile of a bal
ance sometimes acting in the usual way, but also possessed
of the faculty of turning by itself without or against its
weights. This view of an anomalous action of the will,
which it need hardly be said is incompatible with scien
tific argument, subsists as an opinion patent or latent in
men's minds, and strongly affecting their theoretic views
of history, though it is not, as a rule, brought promin
ently forward in systematic reasoning. Indeed the defini
tion of human will, as strictly according with motive, is

T
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the only possible scientific basis in such enquiries.
Happily, it is not needful to add here yet another to the ^
list of dissertations on supernatural intervention and
natural causation, on liberty, predestination, and accoun-y'
tability. We may hasten to escape from the re
transcendental philosophy and theolgov^to starton a more
hopeful journey over more practicable ground. None will
deny thaf, as FacK^ m
by the evidence of his own
consciousness, d^inite and natural cause does, to a
great_g^l£iLl^ determJjifi-imman action, Then, keeping
aside from considerations of extra-natural interference
and causeless spontaneity, let us take this admitted
existence of natural cause and effect as our standingground, and travel on it so far as it will bear us. It
is on this same basis that physical science pursues,
with ever-increasing success, its quest of laws of nature.
Nor need this restriction hamper the scientific study of
human life, in which the real difficulties are the prac
tical ones of enormous complexity of evidence, and imper
fection of methods of observation....„».«
Among evidence aiding us to trace the course which
the civilization of the world Has actualTv"^ol
that great class of facts to denote which I have found J.t
rnnveni (Rnt to i ntrndiir.e
These are
customs. _o
s, and so
which have
een carried on by force oi habit into a new sfaTe of
society different-_-£rQm„lJia±-„iii which they had their
original home, -aad they thus remain
^
amples of an older condition of culture nut of whirh a
ha«ljieen-.-jeyQlved^ Thus, I Enow an old Somersetshire
woman whose hand-loom dates from the time before the in
troduction of the "flying shuttle," which new-fangled
appliance she has never even learnt to use, and I have
seen her throw her shuttle from hand to hand in true
classic fashion; this old woman is not a century behind
her times, but she is a case of survival. Such examples
often lead as back to the habits of hundreds and even
thousands of years ago. The ordeal of the Key and Bible,
still in use, is a survival; the Midsummer bonfire is a
survival; the Breton peasants' All Souls' supper for the
spirits of the dead is a survival. The simple keeping up
of ancient habits is only one part of the transition from
old into new and changing times. The serious business of
ancient society may be seen to sink into the sport of
later genera.tions, and its serious belief to linger on in
nursery folk-lore, while superseded habits of old-world
life may be modified into new-world forms still powerful
for good and evil. Sometimes old t)-|nnfTht.ct, and prar.tir.As
vgll burst out afresjx7''"''To"~tHe~lima
of a world that
thought them^ioiog'^sTnce dead" or ^dying; "¥ere^'''suSLlS^a^
p^sse^ Into revivalt 'as has lately'^
in so "remarkabXe"^way in the history of modern spiritualism, a sub
ject full of instruction from the ethnographer's point of
view.
of tne
the principles pi
of survival nas,
has, indeed,
/lew. The study oi
inaeea.

^
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no small practical importance, for most of what we call
superstition is included within survival, and in this way
rieg~TipennEo'™fB^^
of its deadlTe^ enemy, a reason
able explanation. Insignificant, moreover, as multitudes
of the facts of survival are in themselves, their study is
so effeGtiv-e—iac. tracing the course of the historicar de-"~
yel'opment through which'^
,„I?OS&lb1 e to~"un^rstand
their ^
becomes-a- vital- point of ethnographic research to gain the clearest-.pQssiEig„insi£^^
into their natuge.. This importance must justify the detail~Tiere devoted to an examination of survival, on the
evidence of such games, popular sayings, customs, super
stitions, and the like, as may serve well to bring into
view the manner of its operation.
Progress^ degradation, survival. revival, modijti^
cation5 are all modes of the connexion "that binds together
tlie"coffipl^
of civilization.. It" needs but "a glance
into the trivial details of our own daily life to set us
thinking how far we are really its originators, and how
far but the transmitters and modifiers of the results of
long past ages. Looking round the rooms we live in, we
may try here how far he who only knows his own time can
be capable of rightly comprehending even that. Here is
the honeysuckle of Assyria, there the fleur-de-lis of
Anjou, a cornice with a Greek border runs round the ceil
ing, the style of Louis XIV, and its parent the Renais
sance share the looking-glass between them. Transformed,
shifted J or mutilated, such elements of art still carry
their history plainly stamped upon them, and if
"tory, .yet farther bjgMud..is less easy to read, we are not
to §a^ that because we cannot clearly discern it there""is
therefore iTd., history ,,tEe^
wFth the
fashion of the clothes men wear. The ridiculous little
tails of the German postilion's coat show of themselves
how they came to dwindle to such absurd rudiments; but
the English clergyman's bands no longer so convey their
history to the eye, and look unaccountable enough till
one has seen the intermediate stages through which they
came down from the more serviceable wide collars, such as
Milton wears in his portrait, and which gave their name
to the "band-box" they used to be kept in. In fact, the
books of costume, showing how one garment grew or shrank
by gradual stages and passed into another, illustrate
with much force and clearness the nature of the change
and growth, revival and decay, which go on from year to
year in more important matters of life. In books, again,
we see each writer not for and by himself, but occupying
his proper place in history; we look through each philos
opher, mathematician, chemist, poet, into the background
of his education, — through Leibnitz into Descartes,
through Dalton into Priestley, through Milton into Homer.
The study gf 1 anguaae-Jias. perhaps, doae moxe than any
otheK Inuxeciavixig from our view.-,of human thought and action the ideas of^ chance and arbitary invention, and in
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substituting for them a theory of dev^l npmp»rit by tho en
o^er at ion o;f2ygc[^4dijjij..j^a7t%
ever reasonaBT|"^M~XntejULi&^^
the. facts are^TuTTy'^known,
Rudimentary as the science of culturer s-EilT'is, the symp
toms are becoming very strong that even what seem its most
spontaneous and motiveless phenomena will, nevertheless,
be shown to come within the range of distinct cause and
effect as certainly as the facts of mechanics.
bepopularlv thought more ir^efinite and uncontr
t3ge~produGl^ of thia inTaTpTrnyTXQn in mvths~aiTd~"fiib3res? Yet
any systematic investigation of mythology. on the basis
oi a wide collection oi evTdence, wiTT"show plainly enough
in such efforts of fancy at once a 3eveTo^enT~from stage
to stage, and a production of uniformity nf rp.sixlJi,, from
uniformity of-j&aiis.^^ HereT" as" elsewhere. causeless spontah^irty""is seen to recede farther and farther into shelter
within the dark precincts of ignorance; like chance, that
still holds its place among the vulgar as a real cause of
events otherwise unaccountable, while to educated men it
has long consciously meant nothing but this ignorance it
self. It is only when men fail to see the line of con
nexion in events5, that they are prone to fall upon the
notions of arbitrary impulses, causeless freaks, chance
and nonsense and indefinite unaccountability. If child
ish games, purposeless customs, absurd superstitions are
set down as spontaneous because no one can say exactly
how they came to be, the assertion may remind us of the
like effect that the eccentric habits of the wild riceplant had on the philosophy of a Red Indian tribe, other
wise disposed to see in the harmony of nature the effects
of one controlling personal will. The Great Spirit, said
these Sioux theologians, made all things except the wild
rice; but the wild rice came by chance.
"Man," said Wilhelm von Humboldt, "ever connects on
from what lies at hand..,." The notion of the continuity
of civilization contained in this maxim is no barren
philosophic principle, but is at once made practical by
the consideration that thevL^who wish to understand their
own lives ought to know the stages through which their
Ctffitescarceiy oveFslaTed~"the~l^^
of tnis study of
development, when he declared at the beginning of his
'Positive Philosophy" that "no conception can be under
stood except through its history," and his phrase will
bear extension to culture at large. To expect to look
modern life in the face and comprehend it by mere inspec
tion, is a philosophy whose weakness can easily be tested.
Imagine any one explaining the trivial saying, "a little
bird told me," without knowing of the old belief in the
language of birds and beasts, to which Dr. Dasent, in the
introduction to the Norse Tales, so reasonably traces its
origin. To ingenious attempts at explaining by the light
of reason things which want the light of history to show
their meaning, much of the learned nonsense of the world

XV
has indeed been due.... Such are the risks that philos
ophers run in detaching any phenomenon of civilization
from its hold on past events, and treating it as an
isolated fact, to be simply disposed of by a guess at
some plausible explanation. *
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